Supplements: Instructor's Manual｜Test Bank｜Power point
Author
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, Johns Hopkins University
Description
This new text offers a wealth of diverse, intriguing applications to show where game theory works, where it doesn’t, and why. Accessible to all college students, the book conveys the power, appeal, and beauty of game-theoretic logic, emphasizing problem solving over answers. Especially relevant for majors in economics/business and political science/international relations.
Table of Contents ( Details )
PART I: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER 2: BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION
PART II: SOLVING STRATEGIC FORM GAMES
CHAPTER 3: ELIMINATING THE IMPOSSIBLE: SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE
CHAPTER 4: STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE GAMES WITH TWO OR THREE PLAYERS
CHAPTER 5: STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE N-PLAYER GAMES
CHAPTER 6: STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS GAMES
CHAPTER 7: KEEP 'EM GUESSING: RANDOMIZED STRATEGIES
PART III: SOLVING EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
CHAPTER 8: TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION
CHAPTER 9: TAKING TURNS IN THE DARK: SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION
PART IV: GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
CHAPTER 10: I KNOW SOMETHING YOU DON'T KNOW: GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION
CHAPTER 11: WHAT YOU DO TELLS ME WHO YOU ARE: SIGNALING GAMES
CHAPTER 12: LIES AND THE LYING LIARS THAT TELL THEM: CHEAP TALK GAMES
PART V: REPEATED GAMES
CHAPTER 13: PLAYING FOREVER: REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY-LIVED PLAYERS
CHAPTER 14: COOPERATION AND REPUTATION: APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY-LIVED PLAYERS
CHAPTER 15: INTERACTION IN INFINITELY-LIVED INSTITUTIONS
PART VI: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY
CHAPTER 16: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY: EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES
CHAPTER 17: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY: REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
